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The 1973' Louisiana Constitutional Convention ("CC 73")
happened at a significant moment in Louisiana's political history. It
occurred at precisely the same time that Louisiana's present
competitive two-party system was born. While the emergence of a
two-party system in Louisiana was slow, even when compared to
those of the other formerly Democratic dominant states in the Deep
South, it was dramatic and has had lasting effects. CC 73 helped
define the coalitions that formed the basis of our present competitive
two-party system. This article will first place the constitutional
convention into the temporal context of this dynamic political period
in Louisiana and the American South. Then it will describe how the
specific coalitions that formed in the convention became concrete
precursors to our present party system and speculate on the difference
it has made to present day Louisiana politics.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TwO-PARTY POLITICS
After the Civil War, Louisiana, like all Southern states, entered a
period of absolute supremacy by the Democratic Party that lasted
until the time of the 1973 Louisiana Constitutional Convention. The
reasons for the domination of the Democratic party bear explanation
and are instructive in understanding the changes that finally loosened
the grip of the party. Michael Perman describes three post Civil War
stages of Democratic Party ascendency.) In the first, Reconstruction,
newly re-enfranchised Confederates identified the Republican Party
"as illegitimate on the ground that it was alien in origin and personnel
and hostile in purpose."2  From the 1870s to the 1890s "the
Democrats still did not engage in genuine inter-party electoral
competition, as is expected of normal political parties. Instead, they
continued to delegitimize the opposition that consisted, variously, of
Republicans, Independents, Readjusters, Greenbackers, and
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Populists."3 The final period at the turn of the twentieth century
was the most radical and effective. Using a variety of means to
disenfranchise citizens who might support their opposition, the
Democratic Party "decided quite simply to eliminate the black vote
altogether-and, in the process, a lot of white voters too."4 Perman
summarizes the reasons for Democratic domination, writing: "[a]s
the South's ruling elite, and its system of racial oppression, found
itself threatened, not only during the war, but for the following 100
years, this fear of party became a mind-set that was increasingly
institutionalized until party in any meaningful sense had virtually
evaporated by the beginning of the twentieth century."5
The results of this Democratic domination were stunningly
effective and enduring. In 1945, no Republican had ever been
elected to the United States Senate from any of the eleven states that
comprised the old Confederacy. There were no Republican
Governors in the South. Only two of the one hundred twenty-two
members of the United States House of Representatives from these
states were Republican. While there were a few instances where
Republican Presidential candidates had carried some of the border
states during that time period, no Republican Presidential candidate
had ever carried any of the states known as the Deep South
(Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia and South Carolina).
The South was totally and thoroughly a one-party region.
By the 1970s, the Democratic grip on the South and Louisiana
began to loosen. In 1980, Republicans had returned to the South
with a vengeance. Republican Presidential Candidate Ronald
Reagan had overwhelmed native Southerner President Jimmy Carter
in every Southern state except his home state of Georgia.
Republicans were winning contests for the United States Senate,
House of Representatives and Governor. Louisiana was certainly
not immune to this Republican revolution. Republican
Congressman David Treen was elected to Congress in 1972 and
elected Governor in 1979. In 1976 and 1977 Republicans Henson
Moore and Bob Livingston were elected to Louisiana's
Congressional Delegation. Louisiana had voted for the Republican
nominee for President in 1956, 1964, 1972 and 1980. By the end
of the 1970s, Republicans started on an irreversible path to parity
with the Democrats. Today, a Republican is in his second term as
governor, five of the seven members of the Louisiana Congressional
Delegation are Republicans, the Republican nominee for President
easily won the state in a tightly contested presidential election and
3. Id.
4. Id. at 48.
5. Id. at 50.
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Republicans are winning offices at every level of state and local
government.
How did it happen? Democratic dominance was linked closely
to white supremacy. When the Democrats embraced the Civil Rights
movement in the 1950s and 1960s, Republicans were destined to gain
support from the backlash. While the initial breakthrough at the
presidential level was in 1952 when Republican Dwight Eisenhower
beat Democrat Adlai Stevenson in the race for the presidency, the
1964 election had a more lasting effect.
In 1964, Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater's
opposition to Civil Rights legislation carried him to victory in the
state. The Goldwater victory was a breakthrough because it included
poor and working-class whites as part of the Republican coalition;
these voters would be critical to Republican victories that followed.
In the three decades since that election, Republicans have periodically
won statewide office and consistently won seats in Congress.
Although the racial issues of the 1960s gave Republicans their first
major opportunities in Louisiana, two other factors allowed for more
solid long-term gains.6 The economic message of the Republicans
appealed to the growing suburban white middle classes in Louisiana;
the conservative social agenda articulated by the Republicans
appealed to many Protestants in North Louisiana and pro-life
Catholics in South Louisiana.7
II. EDWIN EDWARDS AND THE MODERN DEMOCRATIC COALITION
These racial, economic and cultural coalitions were forming in the
1973 Louisiana Constitutional Convention. In the early 1970s the
Democratic Party was transforming and reconstituting itself. The
Republican Party would follow in the late 1970s by building enduring
coalitions from those notin the reformulated Democratic base. After
the 1965 Voting Rights Act, African-Americans began registering in
large numbers throughout the South and voting consistently for the
Democratic Party, a party that was viewed by African-Americans as
the party that created voting opportunities. A black-white coalition
proved quite successful in these initial stages of party realignment
and several Democratic southern politicians were elected during these
6. T. Wayne Parent, The Rise and Stall of Republican Ascendancy in
Louisiana Politics, in The South's New Politics: Realignment and Dealignment 204
(Robert H. Swansbrough & David M. Brodsky eds., 1988); Alexander P. Lamis,
The Two-Party South (1988).
7. T. Wayne Parent, Louisiana, in Andrew M. Appleton & Daniel S. Ward,
State Party Profiles: A 50-State Guide to Development, Organization, and
Resources 157 (Congressional Quarterly, 1997).
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years. These "New South" politicians that embraced a biracial
coalition were the darlings of the national news media. Jimmy
Carter, Bill Clinton, Dale Bumpers, Reuben Askew, John West,
William Waller and Edwin Edwards were all part of this breed of
Southern Democrats. Edwards, aware of his role, said in his 1972
inaugural speech, "To the poor, the elderly, the unemployed, the
thousands of black Louisianans who have not yet enjoyed the full
bounty of the American dream, we extend not a palm with alms but
the hand of friendship."8 For Louisiana and the South, this was a
time of racial healing after the bruises of the 1960s Civil Rights
conflicts. While Carter and Clinton were able to use that era of good
feeling to promote themselves into national prominence, Edwards
was successful in building a political dynasty in Louisiana eventually
serving four terms as Governor. He became the inheritor of the Huey
and Earl Long mantle of spokesmen for the downtrodden, adding the
rhetoric of ridding the state of race and ethnic discrimination to the
Longs' message of economic populism.
Edwards, who called the convention, certainly set its political
tone. The promise to write a new constitution to replace the
antiquated 1921 Constitution was a highly visible part of the Edwards
campaign. Voters knew that, if elected, this candidate would not just
propose and enact legislation but would be the architect of a new
framework of government. Therefore, the outcome of the 1971
gubernatorial race had an even greater impact on the state than usual.
This race saw Edwards, a moderate Democrat from south Louisiana
(Johnson), in a highly competitive race with a more conservative
north Louisiana Democrat, Bennett Johnston (Shreveport). Each
candidate vied for support from various factions, who were often at
odds with one another, of the then dominant Democratic party.
Edwards's eventual victory was achieved, in large part, due to his
ability to build an unprecedented coalition between three of these key
factions: labor, Catholic, and black voters.
South Louisiana, in general, tends to be more favorable to labor
issues, and more Catholic, than its northern counterpart. Because
Edwards was originally from Johnson, a south Louisiana town, he
won the labor vote by emphasizing his blue collar upbringing.
Edwards's father was a relatively poor sharecropper, allowing him
fewer of the opportunities enjoyed by the upbringing of his opponent.
Playing on this image, Edwards was able to present himself as more
in touch with the daily lives and problems of the working man and
farmer. Edwards was also the political beneficiary of having a
mother who was both French and Catholic. This combination was
8. Neal R. Pearce, The Deep South States of America 61 (1974) (emphasis
added).
[Vol. 62
WA YNE PARENT & JEREMY MHIRE
helpful for Edwards in this region dominated by Cajun culture, but
Edwards's campaign realized that carrying the south Louisiana
parishes would not be enough. Edwards would have to enlist the
support of a voting bloc previously off limits to most mainstream
Louisiana politicians.
The most impressive, and possibly most important, achievement
of Edwards's campaign was his ability to merge the labor and
French Catholic voting blocs with the black vote, a new and
previously politically dangerous voting bloc. Not since the days of
the populist rhetoric of Huey Long had a Democrat been able to
enlist the support of African-American voters without at the same
time alienating most of their white constituents. Edwards was able
to build this coalition by making the more conservative Johnston
unpalatable to the labor and Catholic blocs, while at the same time
appealing to disenfranchised black voters. Edwards orchestrated a
masterful campaign by actively addressing the issues facing the
black community, while at the same time not alienating his white
constituents by running a campaign singularly on race related
issues. This newly formed coalition was the first time that a
candidate was able to bring white and black voters together
politically in the post civil-rights period.
The coalitions that constituted Edwards's basis of support in the
1971 gubernatorial race bear close resemblance to the factions that
now constitute the modem Democratic party in Louisiana. While
these similarities may seem striking, the framework in which these
coalitions were built may be the key to our modem political parties.
Edwards's coalitions, as well as the ones which organized in
opposition to him, are best seen as precursors to the definitive
moment in the origins of the competitive two-party system in
Louisiana. This definitive moment, as we shall see, became known
as the Constitutional Convention of 1973, CC 73.
Edwards brought to Louisiana politics a new wave of
innovation. Until 1971, only thepolitical shrewdness of the Longs,
spurred on by the appeal of their "share the wealth" programs, had
been able to bring together these previously antagonistic voting
blocs into a single, solid basis of support. Although Edwards was
a far cry from being a populist, he retained the common man
persona that made him appealing to the three key factions. This
newly coalesced basis of support, composed of different, but now
uniquely related, interests banded together to accomplish what was
seen as a common goal. But Edwards, like most Louisiana
politicians of the time, was to find that there was a larger, more
politically intriguing battle occurring not just in the campaign trail,
but also at the steps of the capitol. The politics of campaign
2001]
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coalitions would soon transfer to the politics of interest group
coalitions.
III. INTEREST GROUP POLITICS
The pre-CC 73 Louisiana political framework, like most state
governments, was dominated by competitive interests. From labor
unions to manufacturing associations, special interests jockeyed for
favorable recognition and status from the legislature. While this does
not, at first glance, appear to be counter-intuitive, the degree to which
these competing interests came to dominate the Louisiana political
climate may be unrivaled.
Competition between interest groups in pre-CC 73 Louisiana
politics constituted a unique scenario. Special interests, by nature,
seek to secure the aims and objectives of the constituents they
represent. Because Louisiana politics has become famous (or
infamous) for its stories of back room deals and heavy handed
payouts, as well as its shifty political climate, it is no surprise that
interest groups sought a way to secure their aims apart from the
whims and fancies of less than reliable state legislators. Special
interests needed a way to permanently secure favorable tax statuses,
budgets, and specific regulations from beyond the grasp of potentially
unaccommodating legislators. If legislative statutes failed them, their
alternative was the constitutional amendment.
By adding an amendment to the constitution to protect their
respective objectives, special interests relieved themselves of the
worrisome task of dealing with fickle state legislators. "From 1852
on, the constitution was increasingly viewed as a statutory bank vault
within which the favored schemes, phobias, and interests of the
prevailing elite could be secured 'beyond the reach of fickle
legislatures and ungrateful governors' in the future."9  To gain
constitutional protection for their objectives, special interests had
only to succeed in lobbying the Louisiana legislature and populace a
single time.
The Louisiana Constitution of 1921 allowed amendments by voter
approval after a two-thirds vote in each house of the legislature. This
scenario created a new form of competition between competing
interests who could gain protection for their respective aims. The
manifestation of this new competition is seen by the fact that between
1921 and 1972 the Louisiana legislature approved eight hundred and
two constitutional amendments, with the voters approving five
hundred and thirty-six of them, making the 1921 Louisiana
9. Mark T. Carleton, The Louisiana Constitution of 1974, in Louisiana
Politics: Festival in a Labyrinth 15, 16 (James Bolner ed., 1982).
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Constitution the longest in American history.' As might be
expected, this once promising method of protection for special
interest objectives led to a bigger, more serious political problem.
The shear length and breath of such a document made it
inaccessible to all but a few trained legal scholars and professionals.
Aside from its physical and logistical limitations, however, the 1921
constitution had become a stifling bureaucratic inhibitor. The five
hundred and thirty-six amendments that protected a diverse and
expansive assortment of special interests also prevented the
legislature from adapting, augmenting, or changing many existing
governmental and administrative structures. As mentioned above, the
Louisiana Constitution, by the time of the CC 73, had become a type
of statutory bank, where enactments generally reserved for the
domain of the legislature were transformed into constitutional
amendments, thereby affording them constitutional protection. While
this had the aforementioned positive consequence of removing the
whimsical nature of "politics as usual" from the endeavors of special
interests, it also had the unintended consequence of creating a
constitution so full of amendments that the legislature was hampered
in its efforts to effectively regulate, budget, and administer the
government.
It was little surprise that the stifling limitations put on the
legislature by the amendments to the 1921 constitution, as well as the
directly related voter apathy toward the amending process, became
one of the key incentives behind the push for CC 73. But how does
all of this equate with the development of our competitive two-party
system? The answer to this question lies in how the framing of CC
73 occurred. As we have seen, at least to some degree, it was the
push of special interests to obtain constitutional protection that
ultimately rendered the 1921 constitution impotent. The reaction to
this was a constitutional convention shrouded in promises of fairness,
brevity, and clarity. Part of the mantra for CC 73 had been to
eliminate the barriers that were preventing the legislature from
enacting whatever statutory laws were necessary to achieve both
progress and reform. The barriers preventing this, as might be
expected, were quickly identified as the constitutional amendments
afforded to a bewildering array of special interests. To this end, the
CC 73 was an effort to rid the beleaguered state of the dominating
influences of special interests.
Special interests that enjoyed hard-fought constitutional
safeguards were less than eager to relinquish such protection. From
the point of the special interests, CC 73 was a renewed threat to the
security they had come to enjoy. Although reluctant at first, most
10. Id. at 17.
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special interests came to view the CC 73 as an inevitability with
which they now had to contend. With this realization, renewed
competition between special interests for potential protection in the
new document became the order of business.
The delegates to the CC 73 faced a daunting, if not impossible
task. They had to contend, not only with the same lobbying pressure
that had ultimately rendered the 1921 constitution ineffective, but
also an electorate whose apathy had grown to an all-time high
because of the dominance of these interests in Louisiana politics. It
seems somewhat ironic that the heavily optimistic mind set of the CC
73 was underpinned by circumstances that made the possibility of its
success highly questionable.
It is a great surprise to look back and see that the CC 73 did
succeed, to some degree, in its effort to provide a new and workable
document. The product of the CC 73 was noticeably briefer, and its
coherence was unencumbered by a vast array of amendments. It was
not, however, without fault. As might be expected, the constitution
.that came out of the CC 73 was unable to escape the influence of
special interests. Even though part of the mantra of the CC 73 had
been to remove the influence of special interests in the political arena,
the CC 73 did escape the inevitable inclusion of constitutional
provisions that were seemingly statute oriented. Moreover, the
document that was produced by the CC 73 set the stage for a battle
between competing special interests over hotly contested provisions.
This battle would mark the coalescence of like minded interests into
support or opposition for the new constitution. The recognition of
both the shortcomings of the CC 73, as well as the ensuing political
battle over constitutional adoption, most clearly signifies the
emergence of our present competitive two-party system in Louisiana
politics.
IV. GROUP COALITIONS AT THE CONVENTION
When Mark Carleton reflected back on the document produced by
the CC 73, he noted that one of the most severely scrutinized areas
of the constitution was the provision dealing with civil service."
Interestingly enough, it is the coalitions that formed both in support
and opposition to this measure that would most clearly define our
present day Democratic and Republican party. Partly in response to
the political patronage made famous during the days of Huey Long,
civil service was seen as a way of removing the influences of
favoritism, nepotism, and kick-backs from the appointment of
persons to government jobs. It was the aim of the civil service to
11. Id.at3O-31.
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institute a modicum of meritocracy to governmental employment and
then to shelter those employees from the whims of both legislators
and governors. While civil service was able to shelter governmental
employees from the fickle nature of Louisiana politics, it suffered
from a lack of innovation and efficiency. Strict employment
regulations in the civil service code inhibited agency administrators
by removing their ability to hire and fire employees as they saw fit.
Reform minded conservatives in particular drew attention to this,
noting the spread of the "dead-head" phenomena, and calling for
governmental agencies run more in a business fashion.
Not surprisingly, opposition to civil service provisions in the
constitution came from various organizations representing business
interests. Among these were the various chambers of commerce,
manufacturing associations, and the Republican state committee.
Alternatively, support for the civil service structures came from
various independent labor union organizations, the AFL-CIO, as well
as most of the existing civil service employees. The civil service
provision of the new constitution brought the labor-business debate
to the forefront of political discussion. It would also prove to be the
first issue that would polarize the core coalitions for both the modem
Republican and Democratic parties.
V. PARTY POLITICs AFTER THE CONVENTION
The support for and against the civil service provision in the
convention was mirrored in the vote on the entire constitution in
1974. Among the organizations supporting ratification were the
NAACP, League of Women Voters, Louisiana AFL-CIO, Louisiana
Education Association, and a number of local officials' organizations:
the sheriffs', school boards', district attorneys', police jurors',
municipal associations', and assessors'. Among the organizations
opposed to ratification were the Louisiana Teachers' Association,
Republican State Central Committee, Louisiana State Chamber of
Commerce, Louisiana Manufacturers' Association, Public Service
Commission, and, for what it was worth, the Ku Klux Klan.'I
Support for the constitution was found mostly in south Louisiana,
among blacks, labor and urbanites. New Orleans was the home of the
strongest support, and not surprisingly, the key to its passage.
The voter dynamics in this referendum to the constitution would
begin to gel into the Democratic and Republican coalitions in the
years to come. Prominent Louisiana historian, Louisiana State
University Professor Mark Carleton, writing in 1975, noted that the
most significant feature of this election is something that twenty years
12. Id. at 38-39.
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later would almost eerily parallel the results of the closest two-party
statewide election in Louisiana history: "Indeed, the margin of
victory in the New Orleans area alone, 103,371 votes, 'exceeded the
statewide margin of passage (98,304) by 5,067 votes.""' 3 In 1996,
when Democrat Mary Landrieu defeated Republican "Woody"
Jenkins, her margin of victory (5,788 votes) was due, in large part, to
the 100,000 vote margin she won in Orleans Parish.
This was not simply an odd coincidence. The New Orleans
electorate is a concentration of the strongest components of the
modem Louisiana Democratic coalition. In the years that followed
the convention, Louisiana witnessed regular run-offs between
Democrats and Republican for major statewide offices. Electoral
patterns of support for the Democratic and Republican candidates
emerged systematically from the coalitions that surfaced in the
convention. The two-party statewide run-offs for governor and
United States Senate seats that followed the 1975 vote on the
constitution were as follows: the 1979 gubernatorial race between
Republican Dave Treen and Democrat Louis Lambert; the 1983
election for governor between Democrat Edwin Edwards and
Republican Treen; the 1986 Senate race between Democrat John
Breaux and Republican Henson Moore; the infamous 1991
gubernatorial race between Democrat Edwards and Republican David
Duke; the 1995 and 1999 run-offs involving Republican Mike Foster
and Democrats Cleo Fields and William Jefferson; and the
aforementioned Senate race between Landrieu and Jenkins. The
margins of victory varied widely. In the competitive races (Treen vs.
Lambert, Breaux vs. Moore, Landrieu vs. Jenkins), the same groups,
blacks, labor and urbanites voted Democratic while business, white
rural voters and suburbanites voted Republican. Even in the
landslides, many core parts of the two-parties' electoral coalitions
supported their candidate.I4
VI. THE LEGACY OF THE PRESENT Two-PARTY POLITICS:
CONCLUDING REMARKS
While present two-party politics in Louisiana is a result of a
century of evolution, the coalition politics in play at the 1973
Constitutional Convention were the immediate predecessor to the
13. Id. at 40.
14. See Parent, supra note 6; Wayne Parent & Huey Perry, Louisiana: African
Americans, Republicans, and Party Competition, in The New Politics of the Old
South: An Introduction to Southern Politics (Charles S. Bullock & Mark J. Rozell
eds., 1998); Edward F. Renwick et al., Louisiana, Still Sui Generis Like Huey, in
Southern Politics in the 1990's 280 (Alexander P. Lamis ed., 1999) for a more
detailed discussion of the modem two-party coalitions.
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emergence of a fully realized two-party system. The dynamics of this
convention were telling. The Edwards coalition became the modem
Democratic Party, and the opposition quickly evolved into the
modem Republican Party. Clearly one result of the CC 73 and its
aftermath was the coalescing of interest group support into a
definitive two-party system.
In retrospect, what difference did it make? In one way, it clearly
had a major impact. Today, Louisiana has two competitive parties
composed of well-defined enduring coalitions. While some groups,
like white working class Protestants (the classic so-called "Reagan
Democrats") still vacillate between the two parties, the present two-
party system is grounded firmly in the coalitions seen in the 1973
convention: blacks and organized labor are the core of the Democratic
Party; various business groups form the core of the Republican Party.
In this way, state party politics reflect national party politics
consistently and in a way that is recognizable to the voters.
But, has competitive party politics changed the nature of politics
inside Louisiana more than superficially? Earl and Merle Black in
their classic work on Southern politics, Politics and Society in the
South argue that the promise of a two-party system dramatically
transforming southern politics might be overestimated. "They argue
that southern politics can be expected to perpetuate much of the past
even as a different future beckons."' 5 They may have been justified
in their skepticism. Interest groups in Louisiana seem to have
survived not only the new constitution, but the new political order as
well.
The two-party system in the legislature is clearly a secondary
force: the Democratic controlled chambers of the legislature not only
have Republicans as chairs of several major committees, but a
Republican is President of the Senate and second in command in the
House. Interest groups, on the other hand, have shown to be quite
resilient through this quarter-century of political change. The practice
of protecting salient interests from the yearly whims of the legislature
is seen in the constitutional dedication ofmost of the state's revenues.
The parties are well defined but clearly weak, while interest groups
remain predominantly influential.
Immediately after the passage of the 1974 Constitution, Professor
Mark Carleton, suggested that this constitution was much like its ten
predecessors: dominated by the established political elite. 6 At first
glance, one might conclude that he was misguided in his assessment.
There are new players in this old political game. Before the
convention, Louisiana politics was an exclusive club for a mostly-
15. Earl Black & Merle Black, Politics and Society in the South 360 (1987).
16. Carleton, supra note 9, at 24-25.
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white Democratic Party. The convention, however, was followed by
two fundamentally important revolutions in Louisiana politics: the
birth of the two-party system and the emergence of voting rights for
the one-third of the state that is African-American. Indeed,
Republicans and African-Americans are significant new elements of
the Louisiana political system that followed directly from the
convention.
. To some degree, however, Carleton may well have been right.
Did the convention, and the constitution that it produced, change
Louisiana politics all that much? The elite power structure that
Carleton described, a power structure dominated by long established
interest groups who successfully protect their narrow aims, appears
to have adapted well to all that occurred. Although part of the mantra
of the CC 73 had been to remove the influence of special interests on
Louisiana politics, it is the influence of these groups that continues to
dominate the Louisiana political climate. It seems that the proverbial
phrase "the more things change, the more they stay the same" may
be appropriate in a final analysis of post-CC 73 Louisiana politics.
